


Buchman



But, sir, these are not all the advantages and discoveries I have drawn from the anatomical examination I have made, and thus disclosed in "*this same old coon*;" I perceive very distinctly, by the disordered state of the various organs which I have examined, that they plainly predict the entire overthrow of the federal party, and, with their overthrow, the downfall of all their high-toned federal measures. Their fate seems to be as distinctly marked in the entrails of this animal of whig adoration, as was the fate of Belshazzar upon the wall of his palace chamber; and all the terror that seized him, now shakes them.

I think, sir, I can perceive, with the same distinctness which guided the ancient oracles, in the bowels of this emblem of whig principles, the very States which will cast their votes for the democratic nominee of the convention to be held in Baltimore. I predict from these signs, with oracular certainty, that Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Connecticut, will triumph in the election of their respective number of democratic electors, which will be one of the most triumphant and glorious victories which the democracy of this country or any other ever gained. This is my prediction; and let no whig pagan so profane himself and his coon religion as to repudiate it; for it is drawn from irresistible signs, displayed in the vitals of the animal of his most sacred and political devotion and reverence. Then I would say, in the spirit of all candor, Go ahead, democrats—the signs are in your favor. Unfurl your banner to the breeze. Triumph will be yours. Victory will once more perch upon the democratic standard. Once more you will teach the revilers of republican government, and the enemies of free institutions, that the people are capable of self-government.

Mr. Speaker, patriotism is the spirit by which our political fabric is held together. The elective franchise is the soul of our republic, and the freeman's boast. Let it be supported, and it will support all the rest; all will be safe. The solemnity of the legal and judicial oath is the sheet-anchor of all our moral, religious, and political institutions. Let corruption pollute the ballot-box, and perjury corrupt the sacred sanctuary of truth, and all is lost. Our institutions, political, moral, and religious, will all sink together, and the offspring will be as it was in the French revolution. Your legislative halls will present but scenes of butchery. Plunder, murder, and arson, will be but legalized crimes. And, too, as in the French revolution, your Sabbath will be changed to a decade, and the house of God

to a stable. The word of God and your revealed religion will be paraded through your streets on an ass, in contemptuous ridicule, and consumed on bonfires. Your Redeemer will be postponed to a murderer, and your Maker to a prostitute, styled the goddess of Reason. Your judiciary will be converted into a triumvirate; your seats of justice into a guillotine; and your fields will be drenched in blood. These, sir, will fill the measure of such iniquity, such frauds, such perjury, and such treason, as were practised in 1840, if persisted in, unchecked and unrestrained.

The passage of this bill will destroy the temptation and the means to perpetrate such violence. Let the whirlwinds and tempests of party spirit and party passion run mountain high; the safety of the republic, the purity of the ballot-box, and the security of our free institutions, will not be drawn into the vortex and wreck of ruin. Can we not lay aside all party feelings for this time, and on this occasion, and come up as one man in support of this measure? Now is the time—now is the day. We are on the eve of another presidential election, which will elicit every feeling and every corrupt passion which party strife can engender; and is there not danger that the same scenes of 1840 will be acted over? Is there not danger that our moral, our political, our free, and our religious institutions, may receive another shock, which may palsy them beyond recovery?

Sir, my heart is fixed and set on the passage of this bill; and I feel as though I have a right to appeal to the patriotism of this House for its support; and if I had the voice of thunder, I would extend that appeal to the remotest parts of this Union. I would awaken the attention of every patriot, of every lover of human liberty, and of our free institutions and their duration, to the support of this measure. I would invoke him, in the name of human liberty, and on behalf of his free institutions, by which he expects to perpetuate that liberty; in the name of that majesty which is his, by the rights of a freeman, to send forth his voice to this hall, and demand, and command his representative to support this bill—to make this bill a law of this land.

I would extend that appeal, too, to every press, the potent engine of human liberty, and the terror of crowned heads. I would ask them to raise the strong arm and the loud voice in favor of this bill. I would say to them, now is the time, and this is the occasion, which demand that influence which is theirs. I would ask that same influence in behalf and in support of this measure, which has demolished thrones, torn crowns from the heads of despots, broken crossiers, and redeemed nations.



26 Feb 26 1867 of 115

SPEECH

OF

MR. BUCHANAN, OF PENNSYLVANIA

ON

24

THE OREGON QUESTION.

DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 12, 1844.

The following resolution offered by Mr. SEMPLE being under consideration:

*Resolved*, That the President of the United States be requested to give notice to the British government that it is the desire of the government of the United States to annul and abrogate the provisions of the third article of the convention concluded between the government of the United States of America and his Britannic Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on the 20th October, 1818, and indefinitely continued by the convention between the same parties, signed at London the 6th August, 1827.

Mr. BUCHANAN rose and said:

Mr. PRESIDENT: I feel deeply impressed with the importance of the question now under discussion, and of the necessity which exists for its speedy adjustment. My conviction is strong that a peaceful settlement of this question can only be accomplished by prompt but prudent action on the part of this government. We are all anxious that it should be settled in peace; and there is no senator on this floor more anxious for such a happy consummation than myself. Whilst this is the desire of my heart, I am yet firmly convinced that the mode by which senators on the other side desire to attain this desirable end will utterly fail. Already we are sending numerous emigrants every year across the Rocky mountains; and we are sending them there without the protection of law, and without the restraints of civil government. We have left them, hitherto, to the unlimited control of their own passions. We must send them laws and a regular form of government. We must take them under our protection, and subject them to the restraints of law, if we would prevent collisions between them and the British occupants—the servants and people of the Hudson Bay company. This we must do, if we would preserve peace between the two nations. The present is a question, not of mere theory, but of practical statesmanship; and I sincerely hope that such a course may be pursued as will sustain the rights of the country to the territory in dispute, and, at the same time, preserve the peace of the world.

I care but little as to the mere form of the resolu-

tion proposed by the senator from Illinois, [Mr. SEMPLE.] If it be not altogether perfect, it can easily be amended. This I shall say, however: we ought not to expect that the President, under existing circumstances, would assume the responsibility of giving the proposed notice for the purpose of terminating the treaty of joint occupancy, without the sanction of one or both Houses of Congress. The treaties of 1818 and 1827 are the law of the land. They were ratified by the constitutional majority of two-thirds of the Senate; and their provisions have now been in force for more than a quarter of a century. It could not, therefore, be expected that the President would give the proposed notice on his own responsibility alone. On the question of his abstract power to do so, I express no opinion. Without any technical objections to the mere form of the resolution, and without further remark, I shall proceed at once to the statement and discussion of the main question.

The third article of the convention of the 20th of October, 1818, between the United States and Great Britain, contains an agreement that the country on the northwest coast of America, westward of the Stony mountains, during the term of ten years, with its harbors, bays, and creeks, and the navigation of its rivers, "shall be free and open to the vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two powers," without prejudicing the claim of either party to the territory in dispute. The provisions of this third article were extended for an indefinite period by the convention of the 6th of August, 1827; subject, however, to the condition, that either of the parties, "on giving due notice of twelve months to the other contracting party," might "annul and abrogate this convention." The question, then, is, shall we advise the President to give this notice?

If our government should annul the convention, then each of the parties will be restored to its original rights. In what condition would the United States then be placed? The northern boundary of Mexico, on the Pacific, is the forty-second parallel of north latitude. By separate treaties between the

United States and Russia, and Great Britain and Russia, this power has relinquished all claim to any territory on the northwest coast of America, south of the latitude of fifty-four degrees and forty minutes. Thus the territory in dispute embraces that vast region extending along the Pacific ocean, from the forty-second degree of north latitude to fifty-four degrees and forty minutes north, and running east along these respective parallels of latitude to the summit of the Rocky mountains. Now, sir, to the whole of this territory—to every foot of it—I believe most firmly that we have a clear and conclusive title. This has not been denied by any senator. Under the public law of Christendom, which has regulated the rights of nations on such questions ever since the discovery and settlement of the continent of America, the validity of our title can be demonstrated. I shall, myself, attempt to perform this duty on a future and more appropriate occasion, when the bill to establish a territorial government for Oregon shall come before the Senate, unless, in the mean time, it shall be accomplished by some senator more competent to the task.

The materials for this work of mere condensation and abridgment are at hand. They are all to be found in the powerful speech of the new senator from Illinois, [Mr. BRESEE,] which has made such a favorable impression upon the body; in the able and convincing treatise on the subject by a distinguished citizen of Philadelphia, (Peter A. Browne;) and, above all, by the facts and arguments, the labor of years, collected and presented by Mr. Greenhow, in his History of California and Oregon, which has exhausted the subject, and left not a doubt of the validity of our title.

Assuming, then, for the present, with the senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. CHOATE,] that our title is undoubted, I shall proceed directly to discuss the question whether we should give the notice proposed by the resolution.

And, in the first place, I shall contend that, if we desire to bring the negotiation to a speedy and successful termination—if we wish to make any treaty with England at all upon the subject,—it is indispensably necessary that we should give the notice. And why? From the plainest principles of common sense, and from the policy which governs nations, it cannot be expected—nay, it ought not to be expected—that England will voluntarily surrender the Oregon territory, or any part of it, while the present treaty exists, under which she now enjoys the whole. The *status in quo* (as writers on public law call it) is too favorable to her interests to expect any such result. She now holds, and has held, the exclusive possession of the territory for more than a quarter of a century, for every purpose for which she desires to use it at the present. The Hudson Bay company have claimed high merit from the British government for having expelled our hunters and traders from the country. We have been informed by the senator from Missouri, [Mr. BENTON,] and other western senators, that this company—either directly, by their own agents, or indirectly, by the Indians under their control—have murdered between four and five hundred of our fellow-citizens, who had crossed the Rocky mountains for the purpose of trading with the natives, and of hunting the fur-bearing animals which abound in those regions. They have driven away all our citizens whose pursuits could interfere with their profits. Under the existing state of things—under the present treaty of joint occupation,—they have the

whole country to themselves, and all the profits to be derived from its possession. The Hudson Bay company now enjoys the monopoly of the fur trade, which has poured millions into its coffers, and has greatly promoted the commerce and furnished a market for the manufactures of the mother country. The truth is, that the present treaty of joint occupation, although reciprocal between the two nations in point of form, has proved beneficial in point of fact to England, and to England alone. She has at present all she can desire; and any change must be for the worse. Why, then, should she consent to divide the possession of this Territory with the United States? Why should she be willing to surrender any part, when she now enjoys the whole? Even if we were to yield to her monstrous proposition to make the Columbia river the boundary between the two nations, still would she not desire delay, enjoying already, as she does, the practical ownership of the whole territory south, as well as north, of that river?

Knowing the policy which has always actuated the British government, I should not be astonished, if we could penetrate the cabinet of Mr. Pakenham, to find there instructions to this effect:—Delay the settlement of the question as long as you can; the longer the delay the better for us; under the existing treaty we enjoy the whole of the fur trade; under it we now possess far greater advantages than we can expect under any new treaty.

They have already all they desire; and, my life upon it, there will be no new treaty, if the Senate should, as I have no doubt they will, lay this resolution upon the table for the reasons which have been urged in the debate. Sir, if this resolution should be laid upon the table, accompanied by the able and eloquent arguments of senators on the other side—by the argument of the senator from Massachusetts [Mr. CHOATE] in favor of continuing the present treaty of joint occupation for twenty years longer, and that of the senator from New Jersey [Mr. MILLER] against the policy of sending our citizens to settle in Oregon at all—in my opinion, it will be utterly vain even to hope for the conclusion of any treaty. Great Britain will be glad to enjoy all the benefits of her present position for another quarter of a century.

But if the notice were once given—if it were thus rendered certain that the present treaty must expire within a year, the British government would then begin to view the subject in a serious light. They would then apply themselves in earnest to the settlement of the question. We owe it to Great Britain—we owe it to our own country, to render this a serious question; not by offering threats, for these would be unworthy of ourselves, and could produce no effect upon such a power—but by insisting, in a firm but respectful tone, that the dispute which has so long existed between the two nations must now be terminated. When that power shall discover that we are at last in earnest and determined to urge the controversy to a conclusion, then, and not till then, will she pay that degree of respect to our rights and to our remonstrances “which the proud soul ne’er pays but to the proud.”

It is not by abandoning our rights—it is not by giving to Great Britain another quarter of a century for negotiation, that we can ever secure to ourselves our own territory now in her possession. Until the notice shall be given—judging from the selfish principles which unfortunately too much influence the conduct of nations, as well as individuals—there



will be no adjustment of the boundary question. If, upon the mere arrival of a British minister, (and he not a special minister like Lord Ashburton, as had been rumored, but a resident envoy extra-) we shall a second time arrest our proceedings which had been commenced long before his name was mentioned for this appointment, and greet him with the declaration that we are willing to wait for twenty years longer, then a treaty will become impossible.

My second proposition is, that to arrest all legislative action at the present moment, and under existing circumstances, would evince a tame and subservient spirit on our part towards Great Britain, which, so far from conciliating, would only encourage her to persevere in her unjust demands. I would ask, when has England, in her foreign policy throughout her long and eventful history, ever failed to make one concession the ground for demanding another? A firm and determined spirit is necessary to obtain from her both respect and justice.

The senator from Massachusetts has informed us that "this controversy had not heretofore been considered as very urgent;" and has stated that "if we had waited so quietly for twenty-six years for the adjustment of this question, he did not see why we should not wait six months longer, instead of adopting this measure now." But is not the senator mistaken in supposing that we had waited thus quietly for so long a period? The question has not slept for a quarter of a century. So far from this, that from the day when Lewis and Clark, in 1805, crossed the Rocky mountains, until the present hour, we have been incessantly agitating the subject, and urging our title to the territory in dispute. I requested the executive secretary of the Senate to hunt up all the volumes containing public documents on this subject. I am sorry that I omitted to count the number of these volumes; but I feel confident they exceeded twenty. Ever since I have occupied a seat in Congress, (which is now more than twenty years,) the American people, by their senators and representatives, have been constantly urging the settlement of this question, but urging it in vain. We were in possession of the mouth of the Columbia before the late war; and this possession, of which Great Britain had deprived us by force, was restored to us after the peace under the treaty of Ghent. In an evil hour, under the treaty of 1818, we voluntarily surrendered to that power a joint occupation with ourselves of our own territory. The British government is perfectly satisfied with this treaty; and whilst it remains in force, we may urge and complain until doomsday without effect. From the time when Governor Floyd of Virginia, who has for many years been gathered to his fathers, introduced his resolution in the other House, on the 10th December, 1821, relative to the occupation of the Columbia river and territory of the United States adjacent thereto, the subject has, in some form or other, been brought before each successive Congress. Since then, we have had numerous President's messages and reports of committees, and other documents, in favor of asserting our title by some act of possession; but all without any successful result.

But even if we had been sleeping over our rights for six and twenty years, I ask the senator, is this any reason why we should slumber over them twenty years longer? Is it not rather a convincing argument to urge us at last now to go to work in earnest, and repair the evils consequent on our long de-

lay? But the effect of the argument of the senator will still be—"a little more sleep; a little more slumber; a little more folding of the hands to sleep;" whilst Great Britain continues in the actual possession of the country, and has evinced a fixed determination to hold it as long as possible.

My lamented friend, the late senator from Missouri, (Dr. Linn,) who sat by my side in this chamber, for several years before his death, made the assertion of our claims to this territory the chief business of his useful and honorable life. He thought that, when Lord Ashburton came to the country, the propitious moment had at length arrived for the settlement of this long-agitated and dangerous question. His lordship was hailed as the minister of peace and as the harbinger of a new era of good feeling between the two nations. Mr. Webster himself proclaimed that this special minister was intrusted with full power to settle all our questions in dispute with Great Britain. We all recollect with what enthusiasm his advent was hailed. Dr. Linn, upon the advice of his friends, (myself amongst the number,) ceased to urge the Oregon question on this floor, as soon as the negotiation commenced, in the full and confident expectation that it would be finally settled by any treaty which might be concluded. I hope the Senate will pardon me for saying a few words here in reference to my deceased friend. In him were combined the most opposite and the most admirable qualities of our nature, in more striking contrast than I have ever witnessed in any other man. Gentle as the lamb, and mild as the zephyr, he was yet brave as the lion. "He had a heart for pity, and a hand open as day for melting charity;" but yet "was like the mustering thunder when provoked." Human suffering always drew from him the tear of sympathy; and his active benevolence never rested until he had attempted to relieve the sufferer. He was one of the ablest men who has held a seat in the Senate in my day, and yet he was so modest and unpretending that he never seemed sensible of his own ability, and would blush at the faintest praise. If the first settlers who shall boldly establish themselves in Oregon under the ample folds of the American flag—not those who may "enter the territory prudently and silently"—do not call their first city after his name, they will deserve the brand of ingratitude. I have never known a man—a stranger to my own blood—in the whole course of my life, to whom I was more ardently attached.

In common with us all, Dr. Linn was firmly convinced that the Oregon question would have been settled by the late treaty. There was then every reason confidently to anticipate such a result. Lord Ashburton himself proclaimed that he had been intrusted with full powers to settle all the disputed questions; and, from the condition of England at that moment, no man could have doubted her desire to remove all causes of dissension between the two countries. Her annual revenue was insufficient for her annual expenditure; she had suffered serious reverses in the East, where she was waging two expensive and bloody wars; a large portion of her population at home appeared to be rapidly approaching a state of open rebellion from misery and starvation; and France, her ancient and powerful enemy, had indignantly refused to ratify the quintuple treaty granting her the right of search on the African coast. This, I repeat, was the propitious moment to settle all our difficulties; but it was not improved, and I fear it has passed away forever. Who could then

have anticipated that, under all these favorable circumstances, but a single question would be settled, and this the northeastern boundary? It was not in the confiding nature of Dr. Linn to anticipate such a catastrophe. Some of us, at least, can recollect with what astonishment and mortification we first learned that the Oregon question had not been settled by the treaty. Dr. Linn instantly gave notice that he would press his bill for the organization and settlement of the territory; and this bill passed the Senate at the last session. Are then the United States again to strike their flag? are all proceedings upon this subject again to be arrested in the Senate, on the mere arrival of another minister from England? Although her subjects had been in the exclusive possession of the whole territory from the day when the Hudson Bay company first set foot upon it until 1842, yet Congress at once ceased to prosecute our claim on the arrival of Lord Ashburton. Should we pursue a similar course on the arrival of Mr. Pakenham, is it not morally certain that the new negotiation will produce similar results? This is not the best mode of treating with England. She ought not to expect any such concessions from us. If we desire to obtain justice from her or any other nation, we must assert our rights in a proper manner. If we do this, she will have little encouragement to hope for longer delay; if we do not, judging from her course in the Ashburton negotiation, there is not the least probability of the settlement of the question. We have already surrendered to her our ancient highland boundary for which our fathers fought; these highlands which overlook and command Quebec, the seat of her empire in North America. We have placed her in possession of the highland passes which lead into the very heart of our own country. We have yielded to her the very positions on our frontier, which the Duke of Wellington and a board of British officers deemed indispensable for the defence of her North American possessions. She has obtained all this from our government; and what is worse than all,—what disgraces us more than all before the world—no, sir, I will not apply the term disgrace to my country,—Lord Ashburton had in his pocket Mitchell's map of 1753, taken from the private library of George the Third, which proved the justice of our claim. On that map was traced, by the hand of the sovereign himself, the treaty line according to our claim; and the fact was thus conclusively established, that England was not entitled to a foot of the territory in dispute.

Mr. B. here read from a newspaper the following extracts from the speeches of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Brougham—the first delivered in the House of Commons on the 28th March, 1843, and the second in the House of Lords on the 7th April following:

SIR ROBERT PEELE. But there is still another map. Here, in this country—in the library of the late King—was deposited a map by Mitchell, of the date 1753. That map was in the possession of the late King; and it was also in possession of the noble lord; but he did not communicate its contents to Mr. Webster. [Hear, hear.] It is marked by a broad red line; and on that line is written "Boundary as described by our negotiator, Mr. Oswald;" and that line follows the claim of the United States. [Hear, hear.] That map was on an extended scale. It was in possession of the late King, who was particularly curious in relation to geographical inquiries. On that map, I repeat, is placed the boundary line—that claimed by the United States—and on four different places on that line, "Boundary as described by our negotiator, Mr. Oswald."

Lord Brougham also spoke upon this question, and treated the idea with ridicule and scorn, that Lord Ashburton was bound to show this map to Mr. Webster. His lordship thinks that, from the

handwriting along the red line on the face of the map, describing the American, and not the British claim, "it is the handwriting of George III himself." And after stating that the library of George III, by the munificence of George IV, was given to the British Museum, he says:

This map must have been there; but it is a curious circumstance that it is not there now. [Laughter.] I suppose it must have been taken out of the British Museum for the purpose of being sent over to my noble friend in America; [hear, hear, and laughter;] and which, according to the new doctrines of diplomacy, he was bound to have taken over with him, to show that he had no case—that he had not a leg to stand upon.

And again:

But, somehow or other, that map, which entirely destroys our contentions, and gives all to the Americans, has been removed from the British Museum, and is now to be found at the Foreign Office.

"The late King (says Robert Peel) was particularly curious in relation to geographical inquiries." No doubt he had received from Mr. Oswald himself (the British negotiator of the provisional treaty of peace) the information necessary to enable him to mark the boundary line between his remaining provinces in North America and the United States according to that treaty. Justly has Lord Brougham declared, that if this map had been produced, the British government would not have had a leg to stand upon. It would have entirely destroyed all contentions, and given all to the Americans. I shall not apply any epithets to such conduct. The subject is too grave for the use of epithets. But this I shall say, that, at one moment during the northeastern boundary dispute, that government was ready to apply the match to the cannon, and go to war in defence of a claim which they themselves knew, under the hand of their late sovereign, was totally destitute of foundation.

I shall repeat, without comment, what Lord Ashburton said in reference to the British title, during the negotiation. He stated that he was the friend of the United States—that he had endeavored to avert the late war with England; which was true, and was highly creditable to him. But, after all, with the map in his pocket, he declared, in his letter to Mr. Webster of the 21st June, 1842, as follows:

I will only here add the most solemn assurance, which I would not lightly make, that, after a long and careful examination of all the arguments and inferences, direct and circumstantial, bearing on the whole of this truly difficult question, it is my settled conviction that it was the intention of the parties to the treaty of peace of 1763, however imperfectly those intentions may have been executed, to leave to Great Britain, by their description of boundaries, the whole of the waters of the river St. John.—Page 40.

And yet, after all this, we are admonished by senators to be again quiet and patient, as we were whilst the negotiations with Lord Ashburton were pending, and await the result. If we should continue to follow this advice, the question will never be settled.

But, says the senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. CHOATE,] it would be disrespectful to the government of Great Britain to give the notice, immediately after the arrival of their minister in this country. Disrespectful to give a notice expressly provided for by the terms of the treaty itself! Disrespectful when this notice will produce no sudden and abrupt termination of the treaty, but will leave it in force for another whole year! I ask, is not this period long enough to complete a negotiation which was commenced twenty-five years ago? My feelings may be less sensitive than those of other gentlemen; and this may be the reason why I cannot conceive how



the British government could, by possibility, consider the notice disrespectful. Their sensibility must be extreme to take offence at a measure which, by their own solemn agreement, we might have adopted at any time within the last sixteen years. If, however, they should take offence at our adoption of the very course pointed out by their own solemn treaty, let them, in Heaven's name, be offended. I shall regret it; but much more shall I regret the long delay in the adjustment of this question, which will inevitably result from our refusal to give the notice. It will never be settled until we convince Great Britain that we are in earnest. She will proceed in extending and engrossing the trade of the territory so long as we shall consent to leave her in quiet possession, patiently awaiting the results of a negotiation. The longer the delay, the more essentially will her interests be promoted.

Here, sir, I might with propriety close my argument, having already said all which appropriately belongs to the resolution under discussion; but I feel myself bound to examine some of the positions taken by the senator from Massachusetts. In the opinion of that senator, even if no treaty should be concluded by Mr. Packenham, it would be wise to continue the existing convention, unless circumstances shall change. He believes that, "in the course of twenty years," an agricultural population from the United States would gradually and peacefully spread itself over the Territory of Oregon—"the hunters of the Hudson Bay company would all pass off to the desert, where their objects of pursuit were found, and the country would, without a struggle, be ours." England had no intention of colonizing Oregon, and the senator saw nothing in her policy which would incline her to interpose obstacles to this natural course of events. "No doubt, if we provoked and made war upon her, she would do it; but if we would but enter the territory prudently and silently, with the ploughshare and the pruning hook, he could not see the least probability that she would interfere to prevent us." If we should send hunters or trappers there to interfere with their monopoly, the Hudson Bay company might take offence. "But should we go there *bona fide* as farmers, wishing only to till the soil, he had no doubt that, in twenty years, that great hunting corporation, like one of Ossian's ghosts, would roll itself off to the north and northeast, and seek that great desert which was adapted to its pursuits and objects." England had no intention of colonizing the territory; and, to use his own strong figure, "no more idea of establishing an agricultural colony in Oregon than she had of ploughing and planting the dome of St. Paul's."

I shall briefly examine these positions of the honorable senator; and when subjected to the scrutiny of sober reason, to what do they amount? What is their intrinsic value? They are poetry, and nothing but poetry—expressed, to be sure, with that splendor of diction for which the senator is so highly distinguished, and which, in itself, possesses so much of poetic beauty. But, after all, they are mere poetry. What, in fact, has the senator recommended? A policy which will not stand the test of the slightest examination—a policy to which such a corporation as the British Hudson Bay company will never submit. We are to steal into Oregon quietly, with the ploughshare and the pruning hook; and then, notwithstanding by our agricultural settlements we shall most effectually destroy and drive away all the game which forms the very sub-

stance of that company's wealth, the company will take no offence, and interpose neither resistance nor obstacle to our proceeding! Not at all; we may progress peacefully and prudently, until we shall have converted all their hunting grounds into fruitful fields; and then that ancient and powerful monopoly will retire like one of Ossian's ghosts, rolling itself off into its kindred deserts of the North! It is true that this mercenary and blood-stained corporation has already murdered between four and five hundred of our citizens, who ventured into Oregon for the purpose merely of sharing with them the hunting and trapping of the beaver; yet they will not take the least umbrage, if we shall enter the territory with plough and pruning hook, in such numbers as to destroy their hunting and trapping altogether! These unfortunate men did but attempt to hunt the beaver, as they had a right to do under the treaty of joint occupation, and it cost them their lives; but yet, if all the beaver and other game shall be driven from the country by our settlements, this will all be very well, and the company will never raise a finger to prevent its own destruction! Should this be its course, the Hudson Bay company will prove itself to be the most disinterested and magnanimous monopoly of which I have ever heard or read in all my life. Trading companies are almost universally governed by an exclusive view to their own interest. To suppose for a moment that this vast trading association, with all its hunters and dependants, will gradually retire, with their faces, I presume, to our advancing settlements, is one of the most extraordinary notions that I have heard in this chamber. And this is the mode whereby the senator will preserve the peace between the two nations, and at the same time acquire possession of the territory!

Now, Mr. President, I assert that Great Britain has never manifested a more determined purpose, in the whole course of her eventful history, than to hold and retain the northern bank of the Columbia river, with a harbor at its mouth. Why, sir, she already affects to consider the northern bank of this river as her own, whilst she graciously concedes the southern as belonging to the United States. In Oregon, these banks of the stream are familiarly and currently spoken of as "the British side" and "the American side." Let any of our citizens attempt to make a settlement north of that river, and we shall soon learn his fate; we shall soon hear, if nothing worse, that he has been driven away. I believe that but one American settlement has ever been attempted north of the Columbia; and this is a small Catholic establishment which nobody would ever think of disturbing. In this course, Great Britain displays her deep policy and her settled purpose. Thrice has she offered to divide the territory, and make the Columbia the line between the two nations, and thrice has her offer been rejected. It is now evidently her design to make the possession of the territory conform to her proposition for its division, yielding the southern bank to us, and retaining the northern for herself; and every moment that we submit to this allotment will but serve to strengthen her claim.

Even when Astoria was restored to the United States, in October, 1818, under the treaty of Ghent, Great Britain, in opposition to this her own solemn act, protested that she had the title to the territory, though it does not appear that this protest was ever, in point of fact, communicated to our government. During the progress of the negotiation in 1818,

which preceded the existing treaty of joint occupancy, our government proposed that the parallel of forty-nine degrees of north latitude, which is the boundary of the two countries east of the Rocky mountains, should be extended as their boundary west to the Pacific ocean. What was the answer? "The British negotiators did not make any formal proposition for a boundary, but intimated that the river itself was the most convenient that could be adopted; and that they would not agree to any that did not give them the harbor at the mouth of the river in common with the United States." Has Great Britain ever departed from this declaration? No, sir, never. On the contrary, the assertion of her claim has become stronger and stronger with each succeeding year.

This subject was again discussed in the negotiation of 1824. Mr. Rush again asserted our title to the 49th degree of latitude, in strong and decided terms; but it was as strongly and decidedly opposed by the British plenipotentiaries. All that they would consent to do was to run the 49th parallel of latitude west, from the summit of the Rocky mountains, until it should strike the northern branch of the Columbia, and from thence down the course of the river to the ocean. This proposition was promptly rejected by Mr. Rush; and in writing home to the Department of State, he stated that they had declared more than once, at the closing hours of the negotiation, *"that the boundary marked out in their own proposal, was one from which the government of the United States must not expect Great Britain to depart."*

Again, for the third time, previously to the treaty of 1827, we repeated our offer to divide the country with Great Britain by the forty-ninth parallel of latitude; and she again rejected our proposition; and again offered to make the river the boundary, the navigation of it to remain forever free and common to both nations. In making this offer, her negotiators declared that there could be no reciprocal withdrawal from actual occupation, as there was not, and never had been, a single American citizen settled north of the Columbia. In refusing our proposition, they used language still stronger than they had ever done before; again declaring that it must not be expected they would ever relinquish the claim which they had asserted.

Thus it appears that, in 1818, we offered to establish the 49th degree as our northern boundary; in 1824, we repeated the offer; and in 1827, we again repeated the same proposal; but on each occasion, it was absolutely refused. Our minister, in obedience to his instructions, after this last refusal, solemnly declared to the British plenipotentiaries that the American Government would never thereafter hold itself bound to agree to the line which had been proposed and rejected; but would consider itself at liberty to contend for the full extent of the claims of the United States. The British plenipotentiaries made a similar declaration, in terms equally strong, that they would never consider the British government bound to agree to the line which they had proposed; and these mutual protests were recorded in due form on the protocols of the negotiation. Thus, thank Heaven, we are now relieved from the embarrassing position in which we had placed ourselves, and are no longer trammelled by our former propositions. We shall hereafter assert our claim to the full extent of our right. We shall no longer limit ourselves to the 49th parallel of latitude; but shall insist upon extending our boundary north to 54°

40'; which is the treaty line between Russia and the United States.

To suppose that Great Britain, after these solemn assertions of her title, and these strong declarations that she would never abandon it, will voluntarily and quietly retire from the possession of the whole northwest coast of America; that she will surrender the straits of De Fuca, the only good harbor on that coast, between the 49th degree of latitude and Saint Francisco, in latitude 37° 48'; that she will yield up this entire territory, the possession of which can alone secure to her the command of the north Pacific and the trade of eastern Asia, and, through this trade, her influence over China; that she will abandon her valuable fur trade, and all this fertile and salubrious country, and fly to the northern deserts, before the advance of our farmers, with their ploughshares and pruning hooks, whom we are afraid to cover with the protection of our flag, lest this might give her offence;—to suppose all this, is surely to imagine the most impossible of all impossibilities. From the day that Sir Alexander McKenzie first set his foot upon the territory, until this very day, the proceedings of Great Britain in regard to the region west of the Rocky mountains have been uniform and consistent. She has never flattered for a single moment in her course. She has proclaimed before the world her right to settle and colonize it; and from this claim she has never varied or departed; and yet we are now to be told that she will, all of a sudden, change her policy, and retire before the American squatters who may find their way into Oregon without law, without a government, and without protection!

And all this, too, in the very face of what occurred during the negotiation of the Ashburton treaty. Our northwestern boundary not only forms no part of this treaty; but that important subject is not even alluded to throughout the whole correspondence. We had a correspondence between Lord Ashburton and Mr. Webster on the Creole question, on the Caroline question, on the doctrine of impressment, and on the right of search; but it appears that this Oregon question was found to be so utterly incapable of adjustment, that even the attempt was entirely abandoned. We are told by the President, in his message transmitting the treaty, that, "after sundry informal communications with the British minister upon the subject of the claims of the two countries to territory west of the Rocky mountains, so little probability was found to exist of coming to any agreement on that subject at present, that it was not thought expedient to make it one of the subjects of formal negotiation, to be entered upon between this government and the British minister, as part of his duties under his special mission." Thus it appears that, at so late a period as the year 1842, the claims of Great Britain were found to be so utterly irreconcilable with the just rights of the United States, that all attempts to adjust the question by treaty were abandoned in despair.

Had I been the negotiator of the late treaty, I should have endeavored to melt the iron heart of his lordship. I would have said to him: "You have obtained all that your heart can desire in the adjustment of the northeastern boundary; will you, then, return home without settling any of the other important questions in dispute? Nay, more, will you leave even the boundary question but half settled? At least, let us adjust the whole question of boundary—that in the northwest as well as the northeast. Permanent peace and friendship between the two



nations is the ardent desire of us both; why, then, leave a question unsettled which is of much greater importance, and consequently of a much more dangerous character, than the northeastern boundary—a question which contains within itself elements that may produce war at no distant period. This is the propitious moment for ending all our difficulties, and commencing a new era of good feeling between the two countries. Let us not suffer it to escape unimproved—to pass away, it may be, never to return.”

What the nature of these “informal communications with the British minister” may have been in relation to the Oregon Territory, will probably never be known to the people of this country. No protocol—no record—was made of the conferences of the negotiators. Their tracks were traced upon the sand, and the returning tide has effaced them forever. We shall never know what passed between them on this subject, unless Lord Ashburton’s despatches to his own government shall be published, which is not at all probable. I have no doubt they contain a full record of the conferences; because it is the duty of every responsible foreign minister to communicate to his own government a perfect history of all that occurs throughout his negotiations. I should be exceedingly curious to know what were these extravagant pretensions of the British government in regard to Oregon, which rendered all negotiation on the subject impossible.

It is more than probable that Mr. Webster again offered to Lord Ashburton to establish the forty-ninth parallel of latitude as the boundary between the two nations west of the Rocky mountains. I infer this from the fact that the senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. CHOATE,] in reply to the senator from Missouri, [Mr. BENTON,] at the last session of Congress, had assured him that Mr. Webster had never “offered a boundary line south of the parallel of forty-nine;” that he [Mr. CHOATE] “was authorized and desired to declare that, in no communication, formal or informal, was such an offer made, and none such was ever meditated.” When it had thus been authoritatively and solemnly declared that Mr. Webster had never offered to establish any boundary south of forty-nine, (which I was glad to hear,) it appears to me to be a legitimate inference that he had offered to establish that parallel as the boundary. The senator from Massachusetts can, however, doubtless explain what is the true state of the case.

Here Mr. CHOATE asked whether Mr. BUCHANAN desired him to explain now, or wait till the senator should have concluded his remarks.

Mr. BUCHANAN preferring the latter course, Mr. CHOATE promised to make the explanation, and retained his seat.

But the honorable gentleman has assured the Senate that Great Britain does not intend to colonize in Oregon—no, no more than she intends to colonize the dome of St. Paul’s. And what are the arguments by which he has attempted to support this position? Why, the senator has carefully examined all the British projects for colonization since the year 1826; and he finds that whilst they have been establishing colonies every where else around the globe, not a word has ever been hinted in relation to a colony in Oregon. And does not the senator perceive how very easy it is to answer such an argument? Great Britain could not have colonized in Oregon without violating her own plighted faith to the Hudson Bay company. In December, 1821, she had leased to

that company the whole of this territory for the term of twenty-one years, and she could not have set her foot upon it without infringing their chartered rights.

What, sir! Great Britain not colonize? She must colonize. This is the indispensable condition of her existence. She has utterly failed to impress upon other nations her theoretical doctrines of free trade; whilst she excludes from her own ports every foreign article which she can herself produce in sufficient quantities to supply the demand of her own people. The nations of the continent of Europe are now all manufacturing for themselves. Their markets are nearly all closed against her. She now enjoys nothing like free trade with any of these nations. We are now, I believe, the only civilized people on earth where free trade doctrines prevail to any great extent. The Zoll-Verein, or commercial league of Germany, have recently adopted a tariff of duties which must effectually exclude her manufactures from their ports. The whole world are fast adopting Bonaparte’s continental system against her; and all the nations of christendom seem determined to encourage their own labor and to manufacture for themselves. Under these circumstances, Great Britain, in her own defence, must colonize. She must provide a market of her own for her manufactures; or inevitable destruction awaits them. Wherever she can acquire earth enough to plant a man who will purchase and consume her productions,—her cotton, her woollen, and her iron fabries,—there she must acquire it for the purpose of extending her home market. She cannot exist without colonization. This is the very law of her political being. To imagine, therefore, that she is about to abandon the claim to colonize Oregon without a struggle, is to imagine what seems to me to be very strange, not to say impossible. It is very true that she has not yet, on her own account, commenced the process of colonization in that region; but judging from the most authentic facts, we can no longer doubt what are her intentions.

I have already stated that, in 1821, Great Britain had leased to the Hudson Bay company the Territory of Oregon for the term of twenty-one years. On the 30th May, 1838, this lease was extended by a new lease for another period of twenty-one years from its date. The existence of this last grant was entirely unknown to me until within the last few days. When I mentioned the subject in conversation to the senator from Massachusetts, he informed me that he had seen the new lease; and kindly offered to procure it for me, remarking at the same time that he had intended to mention the fact in the course of his remarks; but had omitted to do so in the hurry of speaking. That such was his intention I have not the least reason to doubt.

The correspondence of the company’s agents with the British government immediately previous to the last lease, is in the highest degree worthy of the attention and solemn consideration of the Senate.

In this correspondence with Lord Glenly, they recounted all that the company had done for the British government as a reason why their license ought to be extended. They boast of having succeeded, “after a severe and expensive competition, in establishing these settlements, and obtaining a decided superiority, if not an exclusive enjoyment of the trade—the Americans having almost withdrawn from the coast.” They inform his lordship that “the company now occupy the country between the Rocky mountains and the Pacific by six perma-

ment establishments on the coast, sixteen in the interior country, besides several migratory and hunting parties; and they maintain a marine of six armed vessels—one of them a steam vessel—on the coast." At each of these establishments, I believe, indeed I may say that we know, they have erected stockade forts; although if this fact be mentioned in the correspondence, it has escaped my observation. In the neighborhood of Fort Vancouver, which is their principal establishment, they state the fact, that "they have large pasture and grain farms, affording most abundantly every species of agricultural produce, and maintaining large herds of stock of every description; these have been gradually established; and it is the intention of the company still further, not only to augment and increase them, to establish an export trade in wool, tallow, hides, and other agricultural produce, but to encourage the settlement of their retired servants and other emigrants under their protection." They represent "the soil, climate, and other circumstances of the country" to be "as much, if not more, adapted to agricultural pursuits than any other spot in America." And they express the confident hope that, "with care and protection, the British dominion may not only be preserved in this country, which it has been so much the wish of Russia and America to occupy to the exclusion of British subjects, but British interest and British influence may be maintained as paramount in this interesting part of the coast of the Pacific."

The extracts which I have just read are from the letter of J. Pelly, esq. governor of the Hudson Bay company, to Lord Glenelg, the British colonial Secretary of State, dated at London on the 10th February, 1837, applying for an extension of their lease. Among the papers submitted to the British government upon this occasion, is a letter from George Simpson, esq. to Governor Pelly, dated at London on the 1st February, 1837. Mr. Simpson is the superintendent of the company's affairs in North America; and, from his knowledge of the country, any information which he communicates is entitled to the highest consideration.

I beg the Senate to ponder well what he says in this letter in regard to that portion of Oregon between the Columbia river and the 49th degree of north latitude, which the British government have so often expressed their determination to hold; and then ask themselves whether they can, for a moment, suppose that Great Britain will voluntarily recede from its possession before our agricultural population:

The country (says Mr. Simpson) situated between the northern bank of the Columbia river, which empties itself into the Pacific, in latitude 46 deg. 20 min., and the southern bank of Frazer's river, which empties itself into the Gulf of Georgia, in latitude 49 deg., is remarkable for the salubrity of its climate and excellence of its soil, and possesses, within the straits of De Fuca, some of the finest harbors in the world, being protected from the weight of the Pacific by Vancouver's and other islands. To the southward of the straits of De Fuca, situated in latitude 48 deg. 37 min., there is no good harbor nearer than the bay of St. Francisco, in latitude 37 deg. 48 min., as the broad, shifting bar off the mouth of the Columbia, and the tortuous channel through it, render the entrance of that river a very dangerous navigation even to vessels of small draft of water.

The possession of that country to Great Britain may become an object of very great importance, and we are strengthening their claim to it (independent of the claim of prior discovery and occupation for the purpose of Indian trade) by forming the nucleus of a colony through the establishment of farms, and the settlement of some of our retiring officers and servants as agriculturists.

These communications, from the governor and superintendent of the Hudson Bay company, urging

an extension of their license or lease, were favorably received by the British government; but Lord Glenelg informs them, in his reply, that the government must reserve to itself, in the new grant, the privilege of establishing colonies on any portion of the territory. To use his own language, "it will be indispensable to introduce into the new charter such conditions as may enable her Majesty to grant, for the purpose of settlement or colonization, any of the lands comprised in it." This was the express condition of the grant; and, upon these terms, the company accepted its new license. The reservation of the right to colonize is written in the clearest and strongest terms upon the face of this charter. Need I add another word for the purpose of proving that the British government do not intend to abandon this country, but that it is their purpose to establish colonies in it? This is an important fact, which proves beyond a doubt that we must speedily manifest a determination to assert our rights, and make a stand for the portion of this territory north of the Columbia, in a different manner from that proposed by the senator from Massachusetts, or consent to abandon it forever.

But the senator from Massachusetts has informed us that the present treaty of joint occupation may continue for an indefinite period—"ten thousand years"—without being in the least degree prejudicial to our title; but that the moment we shall give notice, and break up the convention, the adverse possession of Great Britain will then commence, and her claims will grow stronger with each succeeding year. I admit, in theory, the soundness of the proposition, that whilst the treaty continues, British possession cannot injure our title. But does England admit the correctness of this our interpretation of the treaty? Far, very far from it. Their construction of this treaty, and their conduct under its provisions, have always been widely different from our own. We have understood it in one manner, and they in another entirely opposite.

Previous to the treaty of 1818, Messrs. Gallatin and Rush, in their correspondence with the plenipotentiaries of the British government, proposed that the country on the northwest coast of America claimed by either party should "*be opened for the purposes of trade to the inhabitants of both countries.*" Now, if these words "for the purposes of trade" had been inserted in the treaty itself, no room would have been left for British cavil; but unfortunately they were omitted; and the treaty declares generally that the country shall be open to the vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two powers, without defining or limiting the purposes for which it shall be opened. And how have the British government interpreted this treaty? Precisely as though it had been expressly agreed that both parties, instead of being confined to hunting, fishing, and trading with the natives, were left at perfect liberty to settle and colonize any portions of the country they might think proper. Immediately after its conclusion, the British government fell back upon their Nootka-sound convention of 1790 with Spain; and, under it, (most unjustly, it is true,) claimed the right not only for themselves, but for all the nations of the earth, to colonize the northwest coast of America at pleasure. "Great Britain," say her plenipotentiaries, "claims no exclusive sovereignty over any portion of that territory." What, then, does she claim? To use the language of these plenipotentiaries in 1824, "they consider the unoccupied parts of America just as much open as heretofore



to colonization by Great Britain, as well as by other European powers, agreeably to the [Nootka-sound] convention of 1790, between the British and Spanish governments, and that the United States would have no right whatever to take umbrage at the establishment of new colonies from Europe in any such parts of the American continent." And they felt themselves more imperatively bound to make this declaration, as the claim of the American minister "respecting the territory watered by the river Columbia and its tributary streams, besides being essentially objectionable in its general bearing, had the effect of interfering directly with the actual rights of Great Britain, derived from use, occupancy and settlement."

Thus, sir, you perceive that the British government openly and boldly, twenty years ago, notwithstanding the existing treaty, claimed the right to settle and colonize the country as though it were entirely without an owner; and, if this claim had been well founded, then it would follow irresistibly that they have a right to retain the possession of the colonies which they had a right to establish. It is upon this principle that they speak of the actual rights which they had acquired so long ago as 1824, by "use, occupancy and settlement." What, then, becomes of the senator's argument, that the present treaty may continue for an indefinite period, without being prejudicial to our title? I admit that it is an argument true and just in theory; but the opposite party, so far from admitting its force, entirely repels it. Under their interpretation of the treaty, they claim the right to plant colonies; and if this right existed, it could not be said that Great Britain would acquire no title to the colonies which she had established. It is true, that under any fair and just construction of the existing treaty, she has no right to colonize the country; but she claims this right. She insists upon it; and, in the face of all our protestations, she has gone on, through the agency of the Hudson Bay company, to colonize to a considerable extent.

And what has been our miserable policy in return? We had a clear right to re-establish our ancient fort at the mouth of the Columbia; but this might violate the treaty, and offend England; and although she has erected some thirty forts within the territory, we thought it best to abstain. It was proposed to establish five military posts on the way to Oregon, for the purpose of protecting and facilitating the passage of our settlers over the Rocky mountains; but no; this must not be done; it would be bad faith; and this, although England, through the agency of the Hudson Bay company, has been making settlements all over the country. Whenever we propose to do anything for the purpose of meeting and countervailing her advances, it is decried as a violation of the treaty; and now, at the last moment, the same doctrine is not only held, but, according to some senators, it is deemed wholly inexpedient for us to settle Oregon; and, as a necessary consequence, I suppose we should permit Great Britain to retain her possession, without a struggle. We have been sleeping over our just rights; whilst she has been pushing her unjust claims with the utmost energy. It is a strange spectacle to witness how we are forever holding back, for fear of violating the treaty; whilst England is rushing forward to obtain and to keep the country. She has established a government there; she has commissioned justices of the peace; she has erected civil tribunals; she has extended the jurisdiction of her laws over

the whole territory; she has established forts; she has built ships; erected mills; commenced permanent settlements, and cultivated extensive farms; and, during this whole period, has openly proclaimed her right to do all this, notwithstanding the treaty. And yet, although we have witnessed all these things, we must not move a step, or even lift our hand, because it would be a violation of the treaty! They consider the country as open to settlement; and in 1824, refused to accept our proposition to make the 49th degree of latitude the boundary; because this would conflict with their actual rights derived from use, occupation and settlement; whilst we have carefully refrained from performing any act whatever to encourage the settlement of the country. Her claim to it rests upon settlement and colonization; whilst Congress refuses altogether to settle or to colonize, lest this might violate the very treaty under which she has been all the time acting.

In the face of these claims so boldly asserted by Great Britain, it has appeared to me wonderful that the treaty of joint occupation should have been continued in 1827. In the conferences previous to this treaty of 1827, the British plenipotentiaries made a still bolder declaration than they had ever done before;—whilst they admit, in express terms, our equal right with themselves to settle the country—a right which we have refrained from exercising notwithstanding this admission, lest, forsooth, it might violate the treaty. They inform us of the numerous settlements and trading posts established by the subjects of Great Britain within the Territory; and, as if to taunt us with our want of energy, they say that in the whole territory, the citizens of the United States have not a single settlement or trading post. They again referred to their right to settle and colonize under the convention of Nootka Sound, and say that this right has been peaceably exercised ever since the date of that convention, for a period of nearly forty years. "Under that convention," say they, "valuable British interests have grown up in those countries. It is fully admitted that the United States possess the same rights, although they have been exercised by them only in a single instance, and have not, since the year 1813, been exercised at all. But beyond these rights, they possess none." And yet we have been ever since deliberating in cold debate, whether we could make settlements in Oregon without violating the treaty and giving offence to Great Britain!

They inform us further, that "to the interests and establishments which British industry and enterprise have created, Great Britain owes protection. That protection will be given, both as regards settlement and freedom of trade and navigation, with every intention not to infringe the co-ordinate rights of the United States." Thus, sir, you perceive that Great Britain rests her claims to the country solely upon the exercise of the assumed right to settle and colonize it, and her duty to afford protection to the establishments which have been made by British subjects under this claim. And yet, in the face of all this, senators gravely express serious doubts whether we can, in like manner, send our people to Oregon and afford them the protection of a government and laws, without a violation of the treaty! I think I have proved conclusively that the senator from Massachusetts is entirely mistaken if he supposes that England will ever admit that her possession, during the continuance of the treaty of joint occupation, would have no effect in strengthening her title to the territory in dispute. She has maintained the contrary doctrine on all occasions,

and in all forms, as if she intended a solemn notification to us, and to the whole world, that she would hold on to her alleged right of possession, and never consent to abandon it.

I am glad to say that I now approach the last point of my argument. The senator from Massachusetts [Mr. CHOATE] has contended that as certainly as we give the notice to annul the existing convention, so certainly is war inevitable at the end of the year, unless a treaty should, in the mean time be concluded; and he would have us at once begin to prepare for war. I suppose the senator means that we ought now to be raising armies, embodying western volunteers, and sending our sharp shooters across the mountains; and he thinks it not impossible that Great Britain, in anticipation of the event, may now be collecting cannon at the Sandwich Islands to fortify the mouth of the Columbia. Yes, sir, war is inevitable! Now I am most firmly convinced that, so far from all this, the danger of war is to be found in pursuing the opposite course, and refusing to give the notice proposed. What can any reasonable man expect but war, if we permit our people to pass into Oregon by thousands annually, in the face of a great hunting corporation, like the Hudson Bay company, without either the protection or restraint of laws? This company are in possession of the whole region, and have erected fortifications in every part of it. The danger of war results from a sudden outbreak, under such circumstances. The two governments have no disposition to go to war with each other; they are not so mad as to desire it; but they may be suddenly forced into hostilities by the cupidity and rash violence of these people, thrown together under circumstances so inauspicious to peace. To prevent this, our obvious course of policy is to send over the mountains a civil government—to send our laws—to send the shield and protection of our sovereignty to our countrymen there, and the wholesome restraints necessary to prevent them from avenging their wrongs by their own right arm. This is the course which prudence dictates to prevent those sudden and dangerous outbreaks, which must otherwise be inevitable. The danger lies here. If you leave them to themselves, the first crack of the rifle lawlessly used, may be the signal of a general war throughout christendom. Nothing else can produce war; and this is the reason why I am so anxious for the passage of a bill which will carry our laws into Oregon. Such a bill will be the messenger of peace, and not the torch of discord. My voice is not for war. My desire—my earnest desire is for peace; and I sincerely believe that the course which we, on this side of the house, are anxious to pursue, is the only one to insure peace, and, at the same time, to preserve the honor of both nations.

The senator from New Jersey [Mr. MILLER] believes that an hundred years must roll round before the valley of the Mississippi will have a population equal in density to that of some of the older States of the Union; and that for fifty years at least our people should not pass beyond their present limits. And in this connexion, he has introduced the Texas question. In regard to that question, all I have now to say is, "that sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." I have no opinion to express at this time on the subject. But this I believe: Providence has given to the American people a great and glorious mission to perform, even that of extending the blessings of Christianity and of civil and religious liberty over the whole North American continent.

Within less than fifty years from this moment, there will exist one hundred millions of free Americans between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. This will be a glorious spectacle to behold;—the distant contemplation of it warms and expands the bosom. The honorable senator seems to suppose that it is impossible to love our country with the same ardor, when its limits are so widely extended. I cannot agree with him in this opinion. I believe an American citizen will, if possible, more ardently love his country, and be more proud of its power and its glory, when it shall be stretched out from sea to sea, than when it was confined to a narrow strip between the Atlantic and the Alleghanies. I believe that the system of liberty, of law, and of social order which we now enjoy, is destined to be the inheritance of the North American continent. For this reason it is, that the Almighty has implanted in the very nature of our people that spirit of progress, and that desire to roam abroad and seek new homes and new fields of enterprise, which characterizes them above all other nations, ancient or modern, which have ever existed. This spirit cannot be repressed. It is idle to talk of it. You might as well attempt to arrest the stars in their courses through heaven. The same Divine power has given impulse to both. What, sir! prevent the American people from crossing the Rocky mountains? You might as well command Niagara not to flow. We must fulfil our destiny. The question presented by the senator from New Jersey is, whether we shall vainly attempt to interpose obstacles to our own progress, and passively yield up the exercise of our rights beyond the mountains on the consideration that is impolitic for us ever to colonize Oregon. To such a question I shall give no answer. But, says he, it will be expensive to the treasury to extend to Oregon a territorial government. No matter what may be the expense, the thing will eventually be done; and it cannot be prevented, though it may be delayed for a season.

But again: Oregon, says the senator from New Jersey, can never become a State of this Union. God only knows. I cannot see far enough into the future to form a decided opinion. This, however, I do know; that the extension of our Union thus far has not weakened its strength; on the contrary, this very extension has bound us together by still stronger bonds of mutual interest and mutual dependence. Our internal commerce has grown to be worth ten times all our foreign trade. We shall soon become a world within ourselves. Although our people are widely scattered, all parts of the Union must know and feel how dependent each is upon the other. Thus the people of the vast valley of the Mississippi are dependent upon the northern Atlantic States for a naval power necessary to keep the mouth of the Mississippi open, through which their surplus produce must seek a market. In like manner, the commercial marine of the Eastern States is dependent upon the South and the West for the very productions, the transportation of which all over the earth affords it employment. Besides, the Southern and Southwestern States are protected by the strength of the Union from the invasion of that fanatical spirit which would excite a servile war, and cover their fair land with blood. This mutual dependence of all the parts upon the whole, is our aggregate strength. I say, then, let us go on whithersoever our destiny may lead us. I entertain no fears for the consequences, even should Oregon become a State. I do not pretend to predict whether



it ever will or not; but if, in a manly and temperate tone, we adhere to our rights, we shall at least spread over her mountains and valleys a population identified with ourselves in religion, liberty and law. We shall at least bestow upon them the blessing of our own free institutions. They will be kindred spirits of our own; and I feel no apprehension that they will ever excite the Indians of Oregon to attack our remote and defenceless frontiers. They and their fathers have suffered too severely from such a policy on the part of the British government to permit them to pursue a similar policy. They will at least be good neighbors.

Has it never occurred to the senator from Massachusetts how inconsistent his arguments are with each other? In one breath, he tells the Senate that Great Britain will go to war for Oregon; and in the next that the Hudson Bay company will voluntarily retreat before the advancing tide of our agricultural population, and abandon it without a struggle. Rest assured, sir, England is too wise to risk a war for such a possession, valuable as it may be, on such a claim of title as she presents. She is wise as she is powerful. Look at her position in regard to Ireland. What is that island at this hour but a magazine of gunpowder, ready to explode at any instant? A single spark may light in a moment the flames of a civil war. Look at the discontents which so extensively prevail throughout the island of Great Britain itself, springing from the want and misery of millions of her subjects, and from other dangerous causes which I shall not now enumerate. Although in profound peace with all the world, in addition to all the other taxes on her subjects, she has been compelled to resort to a heavy income tax to support her government. She is dependent upon us for the most valuable foreign trade which she enjoys with any civilized nation; nor can she supply the demands of China for her cotton fabrics, and thus realize the visions of wealth which she sees in the perspective, without first obtaining the raw material from our fertile fields. England, as I have already said, is wise as well as great and powerful; and she will never go to war with us unless upon a question in which her honor is involved. It is a moral impossibility that, at this day, in the nineteenth century of the Christian era, Great Britain will go to war for Oregon; when the facts and arguments in favor of our title are so clear, that they would prove at once to be conclusive before any impartial, independent, and enlightened tribunal. There is no danger of a war, unless it may be from our own pitiful and pusillanimous course—unless, without making any serious effort to adjust our conflicting claims, we timidly stand by and suffer her to settle the territory to such an extent that it will be out of her power to abandon her subjects there, without violating her faith to them. The present is the propitious moment to settle the whole question; and I conscientiously believe that the mode proposed by my friends and myself would prove the best means of attaining the object.

I admit, with regret, that some very dangerous symptoms exist in both countries at the present moment. The whole press of Great Britain—her magazines and quarterlies, and all, without distinction of sect or party—for the last two years, has teemed with abuse of America, and all that is American. Our institutions, our literature, and everything connected with us, have been subjects of perpetual vituperation. Such abuse is unexampled at any former period of her history. Thus the minds of

the British people have been inflamed into national hostility against us.

And, on the other hand, what is the state of public feeling among ourselves? Although there are many, especially in our large cities, who entertain an affectionate feeling towards England, (inasmuch that, on a great public occasion in the largest of these cities, the health of "the President of the United States" was drunk in silence, whilst that of "Queen Victoria" was received with thunders of applause,) yet, among the great mass of our people, a very different feeling prevails. They still remember the wrongs they have endured in days past; they remember these, perhaps, with too deep a sensibility. And although senators on this floor may please their ears with terms of mutual endearment by styling the two nations "the mother" and "the daughter," yet a vast majority of our countrymen are penetrated with the conviction that, towards us, England has ever acted the part of a cruel step-mother. It is this deep-wrought conviction, these associations of former scenes with the universal abuse at present poured out upon us by the British press and people, which lie at the foundation of the national enmity which now too extensively prevails. It is these injuries on the one side, and their remembrance on the other, which keeps up the ill blood between the two countries. There is surely nothing in the existing relations between them which will cause our people to forget that there is one calamity still worse than war itself, and that is the sacrifice of national honor.

I repeat the declaration, that, for myself, I am deeply anxious to preserve peace. There is nothing like blustering in my nature; and the use of language of such a character would be unworthy of ourselves. Besides, it could produce no possible effect upon the power with whom we have this controversy, and would injure rather than advance our cause. I am, notwithstanding, in favor of asserting our rights in a manly tone, and in a fearless manner. The time has, I believe, come, when it is dangerous any longer to tamper with the Oregon question. So far as my voice may go, I shall refuse longer to delay the settlement of this question. I shall not consent to its postponement. I would send our people west of the Rocky mountains whenever they may choose to go; but I would send them there under the protection and restraint of law; and if I did not in my heart believe this to be the best mode of insuring to us the possession of our own territory, and preserving the national peace in company with the national honor, I should not so long have detained the Senate in presenting my views on this important subject.

IN SENATE, March 20, 1844.

*Extract from the remarks of Mr. Buchanan in reply to Mr. Rives, on the subject of the map of George III.*

After (at the request of Mr. Buchanan) extracts from the speeches of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Brougham had been read by the secretary from Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, containing all they had said on the subject of this map—which will be found in the appendix—Mr. Buchanan proceeded to say, that after the reading of these extracts, it would require but few observations from him to establish his first position; which was, that the British government, at the time when they sent Lord Ashburton here to negotiate a treaty, were in possession of a map of such high authority, and such undoubted authenticity, that in the opinion both of Sir Robert

Peel, the prime minister of England, and Lord Brougham, its production would have settled the northeastern boundary question, beyond all further controversy, in favor of the United States. In order to illustrate the conclusive character of this map, it might be necessary to make a very few observations.

Richard Oswald was the sole negotiator, on the part of Great Britain, of the provisional articles of the treaty of peace, concluded with the United States at Paris, on the 30th November, 1782. He, Mr. B., had carefully compared the article of this treaty defining the boundaries of the United States, with the corresponding article in the definitive treaty of peace concluded on the 3d September, 1783, and found them to be identically the same,—word for word. It was clear, therefore, that Mr. Oswald's treaty had fixed the boundaries of the United States; and that, in this respect, the subsequent treaty of 1783, negotiated by David Hartley, on the part of Great Britain, was but a mere copy and ratification of the treaty of 1782.

It was well known that George the Third prized his North American colonies as the most precious jewel in his crown. He had adhered to them with the grasp of fate; and even when, at one time, Lord North was willing to bring the war to a conclusion by acknowledging their independence, the King, still hoping against hope, that he might ultimately be able to subdue them, insisted on its continuance a little longer. It was notorious to the whole world that he felt the deepest interest in the question. Was it not, then, highly probable—nay, was it not absolutely certain, that when Mr. Oswald returned from Paris, after concluding the provisional treaty, the very first inquiry of his sovereign would be,—where is the boundary line of my dominions in America? Show me on the map what portion of them the treaty has retained, and what portion it has surrendered. Besides, such an inquiry would fall in with one of the King's peculiar tastes, for he “was (says Sir Robert Peel) particularly curious in respect to geographical inquiries.”

George the Third, as history represented him, was probably, to a certain extent, a man of narrow prejudices; but he was a sovereign of sound judgment, and incorruptible personal integrity. Those best calculated to judge of his abilities had spoken of them in the most favorable terms. Mr. B. here referred to the account which had been given by Mr. Wesley and Dr. Johnson of their interviews with him. When Mr. Adams, our first minister to Great Britain, after the treaty of peace, was presented to the King, his declaration was characteristic and honorable: “I have been the last man in my dominions to accede to this peace which separates America from my kingdom: I will be the first man, now it is made, to resist any attempt to infringe it.” It now appeared that there had been found in his private library a map, on which was marked a boundary line between his North American provinces and the United States, which gave us the whole of the disputed territory; and if this had been all, the fact might possibly have been explained consistently with the claims of Great Britain. But, according to the testimony of Sir Robert Peel, on this “broad red line” there was marked, in four different places, not merely the words “boundary of the United States,” nor yet “boundary of Mr. Oswald's treaty;” but these emphatic word—“Boundary, as described by our negotiator, Mr. Oswald.” Was not this convincing—conclusive proof, that

either Mr. Oswald had marked this boundary line, or that it had been done by some person under his direction, at the request of George III himself? But even this was not all: Lord Brougham had expressed the opinion in the House of Lords, from the information he had received, that the words, “Boundary, as described by our negotiator, Mr. Oswald,” was in the proper hand-writing of that sovereign.

After all this, well might Sir Robert Peel declare that he did not believe “that that claim of Great Britain was well founded; that it is a claim which the negotiators intended to ratify;” and well might Lord Brougham say, in his characteristic manner, that the production of this map by Lord Ashburton would have shown “that he had not a leg to stand upon,” and that it “entirely destroys all our contention, and gives all to the Americans.”

Here, then, was the highest and most conclusive evidence against the British claim. Here was the acknowledgment of the British sovereign himself, under his own hand, from whose kingdom the American colonies had been wrested, that the boundary described by his own negotiator in the treaty of peace gave the whole of the disputed territory to the United States. Here was the confession against himself, of the individual interested, above all others, in the question, and made long before any controversy had arisen on the subject. It was highly probable—nay, almost certain,—that this map, found in the library of George III, was the very map from which Mr. Faden, the British royal geographer, drew his map of 1783, mentioned by Sir Robert Peel, which also gave to the United States all the territory in dispute.

But the Senator from Virginia had contended that there was no evidence to prove that Lord Ashburton, when he concluded his treaty, had any knowledge of the existence of this map; had declared that if it were in his possession, when he assured Mr. Webster, in the most solemn manner, that it was his belief that the negotiators of the treaty of 1782 meant to throw all the waters which were tributary to the river St. John within the British territory, it was impossible he could, with honor, have made such an asseveration; and that, admitting the map to be as he (Mr. B.) had described it, “no epithet in the language would be strong enough to express the infamy which must brand any government which could conduct its high diplomatic intercourse in such a manner.”

Now, sir, let me, in the first place, do justice to myself, as well as to Lord Ashburton. After a careful examination of the debate as reported by Hansard, the highest authority, and which he had never before seen, he most cheerfully admitted that the reference in the following sentence of Sir Robert Peel, was to Lord Palmerston and not to Lord Ashburton: “That map was in possession of the late King, and it was also in possession of the noble lord; but he did not communicate its contents to Mr. Webster.” From the newspaper reports of the debate which he had read, he had never doubted—he had never heard it doubted by any person, but that the reference was to Lord Ashburton. He had been convinced of his error, however, by Hansard's report of the debate, and it afforded him great pleasure to retract it.

But, did it not require a mantle of charity broader than had ever been cast over any individual, to believe that the British government, being in possession of such a map—a map with such marks of authenticity and such claims to the most conclusive



authority—would have sent out Lord Ashburton to negotiate a treaty in relation to the very boundary which it described, and yet have left him in ignorance of its existence? Would they not, at least, have furnished him a copy of it? for he supposed the original was too precious to be suffered to leave the Foreign Office. It was possible Lord Ashburton's character stood so high, as a man of honor and integrity, that the British ministry might have deemed it unsafe to intrust him with such a secret, so fatal to their claims, from an apprehension that he might prove unwilling to exert himself in a cause which he would then have known to be so bad. Mr. B. hoped this might prove to be the fact; and declared that if it should be made clearly to appear, or if Lord Ashburton himself would disclaim that he had any knowledge of the existence of such a map, his opinion of that gentleman was so high he would rise instantly in his place and do him justice.

There was one sentence in Sir Robert Peel's speech, in which he observed that Lord Ashburton "had a right to presume that he was sent abroad in possession of all the elements of information on which a satisfactory conclusion could be come to." Undoubtedly he had a right thus to presume; and if this map had been concealed from him, he would have had just cause of complaint. If Lord Ashburton was not present at the debate, (and gentlemen informed him that he was not,) he was undoubtedly one of the first persons who read the report of it the next morning in the London journals. Now, if the government had left him in ignorance of the existence of a document so important in relation to his mission—a map from the King's own library—should we not have heard some explanation from him? Would he not, at once, on the floor of the House of Lords, have indignantly denounced the concealment from him of such a proof of the justice of our claims—a concealment which had caused him erroneously to give to Mr. Webster the most solemn personal assurances of his deep conviction of the justice of the British claim? Would not the speeches of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Brougham, and the fact of the existence of this map which they disclosed, have so nearly touched his sense of honor, that he could not have remained silent? Would he not at once have explained to us and to the whole world the position in which he had been left by the British ministry? Mr. B. said, it *might* be that he did not know of the existence of the map; but he was greatly afraid that Lord Ashburton entertained the same views of the duty of a negotiator which had been avowed by Sir Robert Peel in the House of Commons, and Lord Brougham in the House of Lords—that he was no more bound to produce any evidence which might operate against the interest of his own government, no matter how unfounded their claim might be, than a lawyer was bound to disclose testimony which might injure his client. It was for this reason that, in referring to Lord Ashburton's conduct, he had studiously confined himself to the facts alone, and had avoided the use of all epithets.

But the senator from Virginia had gone further, and expressed his doubts as to whether the present British ministers themselves had any knowledge of the existence of this map of George the Third, when they sent Lord Ashburton upon his mission. He would examine this position for a few moments.

How had this map been removed from the King's library? It was stated that the entire library of his father had been given by the munificence of George

IV to the British Museum. From thence it was removed to the Foreign Office during the time when Lord Palmerston was Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and placed among the archives of that department. Could it then be possible that the present British ministry were not aware of its existence? A map of such high importance, transferred from the British Museum, where it was public, (doubtless lest the eye of some prying American might rest upon it,) to the Foreign Office, and yet the successor of Lord Palmerston remain ignorant of its existence! A document the most important of any on the face of the earth for its bearing on the proposed treaty with this country, and yet the British Minister for Foreign Affairs know nothing concerning it while preparing the instructions for Lord Ashburton! It was impossible to imagine that some one of the officials in the Foreign Office, when Lord Aberdeen was investigating the subject, should not have brought this all-important document to his notice, even if we could suppose he had before been ignorant of its existence. If Lord Palmerston had removed it from the Foreign Office on his own retirement, this fact would have been stated by Sir Robert Peel, and he would have declared that it had never come to his knowledge. Yet, throughout his remarks, he spoke of it as he would have done of any other well known document, without the slightest intimation that the present ministry had been ignorant of its existence.

Now, in the face of all that had transpired, both in the House of Commons and the House of Lords, the senator from Virginia had produced an anonymous note appended to a pamphlet containing Mr. Gallatin's memoir on the northeastern boundary, in which the unknown author says: "We have authority for stating that Lord Aberdeen has said that he was not personally aware of the existence of this map till after the conclusion of the treaty; and that Lord Ashburton was equally ignorant of it till his return to England."

This was said; but by whom? Not by Lord Aberdeen—not by Lord Ashburton. Neither of them had ever made such a declaration in the House of Lords. Had any person ever disputed the fact that this map was in the Foreign Office when Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen came into power, more than a year before the date of Lord Ashburton's mission? It was impossible that this map should have escaped the notice of Lord Aberdeen, unless it had been criminally kept a profound secret from him, for some mysterious and unaccountable reason, by the officials whose duty it was to place in his hands all the information relative to this most important negotiation. Lord Aberdeen had never accused them of any such concealment. The time to have disclaimed all knowledge of the existence of the map was when the whole subject was under debate in Parliament, and when Sir Robert Peel acknowledged before the world that the claim which the British government had set up against us for a portion of our territory was unfounded. The assertion in that note *might* be true: it was possible; but it was scarcely within the limits of the most remote probability.

But this anonymous writer had gone still further, and had even cast doubts upon the correctness of Hansard's report of the debate in the House of Commons—stating that, according to another report, Sir Robert Peel, instead of asserting that he did not believe the British claim was well-founded, had stated his belief that it was well-founded. What report this could have been, was not stated. But could such

an assertion in an anonymous note weigh a feather against the report in Hansard's Parliamentary Debates? A man writing under no responsibility, might make any assertion he pleased. Mr. B. did not know whether these speeches in Hansard were or were not revised by the speakers themselves; but he knew that they were considered the most authentic reports of any that were published.

The senator from Virginia, impelled by his own high sense of honor, had declared that no epithet in our language could be strong enough to express the infamy of any government which conducted the high intercourse of its diplomacy in such a manner as would justly be inferred from the concealment of a map like this by the British ministry. But can doubt longer remain as to the fact of concealment on their part? In the House of Lords, Lord Aberdeen had been sitting by Lord Brougham when he made the speech from which extracts had been read to the Senate, and when he had ridiculed the idea with scorn that the British government were under any obligation to produce this map. Nay, more: Lord Aberdeen had several times been appealed to by Lord Brougham in the course of his address; and yet he expressed no dissent, but sat in silence. Now Mr. B., whilst he agreed with the senator from Virginia as to the immorality of such conduct, could not think that it deserved such severe censure as had been applied to it. But did not the honorable senator perceive that all the severity of his language now applied, in its fullest force—in all its length and breadth—to the present British ministry? He agreed with the senator that diplomacy was now conducted in a fairer and franker manner than it had been in ancient times; and he could never concur in the doctrine put forth by Lord Brougham, as to the lawfulness of concealing all evidence which made against our own side of the question in a national dispute. According to the maxims of the ancient diplomacy and the doctrine of Lord Brougham, a negotiator was bound to act for his country, in conducting a negotiation, just as a lawyer acted for his client, in conducting a cause. He must take all advantages he could obtain, and conceal everything which might weaken his own side of the question. His lordship had even ridiculed, in the bitterest and most scornful manner, the idea of showing one's hand in such a game. Here Mr. B. quoted Lord Brougham's language.

There was one view of the case, however, which presented a still more serious aspect against the British ministry than the concealment of this map, highly improper as that may have been. It was this: that in the days of Lord Palmerston's ministry the British government was willing to press this claim to the point of actual war between the two nations, knowing, at the same time, as it now clearly appeared they did, that their claim was false and unjust. Nothing but an overruling Providence had averted this calamity from the two nations, and prevented an actual collision between their forces on the northeastern boundary.

#### APPENDIX.

*Extract from Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, (3d series, vol. 67, pages 1247, '48, '49, and '50,) of a speech delivered by Sir Robert Peel in the House of Commons, on the 21st March, 1843, on the subject of the treaty of Washington.*

But the noble lord considers that a certain map which has been found in the archives of the Foreign Office at Paris is conclusive evidence of the justness of the British

claims. Now, sir, I am not prepared to acquiesce in any such assertion. Great blame has been thrown upon Mr. Webster with respect to this map. He has been charged with perfidy and want of good faith in not having at once disclosed to Lord Ashburton the fact of his possessing this map. Now, I must say that it is rather hard, when we know what are the practices of diplomatists and negotiators,—I say it is rather hard to expect that the negotiator on the part of the United States should be held bound to disclose to the diplomatist with whom he was in treaty all the weak parts of his case; and I think, therefore, that the reflection cast upon Mr. Webster—a gentleman of worth and honor—are, with respect to this matter, very unjust. This map was, it is true, found in the archives of the Foreign Office at Paris; and a letter of Dr. Franklin's has also been found, having reference to some map; but there is no direct connexion between the map so found and the letter of Dr. Franklin. In general, there is such a connexion, as in the case of maps referred to in despatches; but there is none in this case. There is nothing to show that the map so found is the identical map referred to by Dr. Franklin in his letter; and nothing can be more fallacious than relying on such maps. For, let me state what may be said upon the other side of the question with respect to maps. We made inquiry about those maps in the Foreign Office at Paris, and we could find none such as that in question at first. We have not been so neglectful in former times with respect to the matter as the noble lord seems to think. We made inquiries, in 1826 and 1827, into the maps in the Foreign Office at Paris, for the purpose of throwing light upon the intentions of the negotiators of 1783. A strict search was made for any documents bearing in any manner upon the disputed question; but, at that time, neither letter nor map could be found. However, there were afterwards discovered, by a gentleman engaged in writing a history of America, a letter and a certain map, supposed by him to be the map referred to in the letter. In answer to our first inquiry, as I have already stated, no such map could be discovered. The first which we received from the Foreign Office at Paris was a map framed in 1783 by Mr. Faden, geographer to the King of England. On that map is inscribed, "A map of the boundary of the United States, as agreed to by the treaty of 1783: by Mr. Faden, geographer to the King." Now, sir, that map placed the boundary according to the American claim. Yet it was a cotemporary map, and it was published by the geographer to the British King. There was a work which I have here, a political periodical of the time, published in 1783, called *Bewie's Journal*. It gives a full report of the debate in Parliament upon the treaty then being concluded; and, in order to illustrate the report, it also gives a map of the boundaries between the countries as then agreed to. That map, sir, also adopts the line claimed by the United States. On subsequent inquiry at Paris, we found a map, which must be the map referred to by Mr. Jared Sparks. There is placed upon that map a broad red line, and that line marks out the boundary as claimed by the British. It is probably a map by M. d'Anville, of 1746, and there can be no doubt but that it is the map referred to by Mr. Jared Sparks; but we can trace no indication of connexion between it and the despatch of Dr. Franklin. To say that they were connected, is a mere unfounded inference.

But there is still another map. Here—in this country—in the library of the late King, was deposited a map by Mitchell, of the date 1753. That map was in the possession of the late King, and it was also in possession of the noble lord, but he did not communicate its contents to Mr. Webster. It is marked by a broad red line, and on that line is written, "Boundary, as described by our negotiator, Mr. Oswald;" and that line follows the claim of the United States. That map was on an extended scale. It was in possession of the late King, who was particularly curious in respect to geographical inquiries. On that map, I repeat, is placed the boundary line—that claimed by the United States—and on four different places on that line, "Boundary, as described by Oswald." Now, I do not say that that was the boundary ultimately settled by the negotiators; but nothing can be more fallacious than founding a claim upon cotemporary maps, unless you can also prove that they were adopted by the negotiators; and, when the noble lord takes it for granted that, if we had resorted to arbitration, we should have been successful in obtaining our claims, I cannot help thinking that the matter would be open to much discussion. Indeed, I do not believe that that claim of Great Britain was well founded—that is a claim which the negotiators intended to ratify. I cannot say, either, that the inquiries which have been instituted since Mr. Sparks's discovery have materially strengthened my conviction either way. I think they leave matters much as they were; and nothing, I think, can be more delusive than the expectation that, if the question were referred to arbitration, the



decision would inevitably have been given in your favor, in consequence of the evidence of maps, which would not be regarded as maps recognised by the negotiators themselves. And then, sir, with reference to the maps discovered subsequently to the conclusion of the negotiations conducted by Lord Ashburton. The noble lord opposite has stated that his predecessor in office had made all possible inquiry into the matter, and possessed all the elements of information connected with it. Lord Ashburton, then, had a right to draw the same conclusion. He had a right to presume that he was sent abroad in possession of all the elements of information on which a satisfactory conclusion could be come to; and, therefore, the subsequent discovery of the map in Paris, even if it could be positively connected with Dr. Franklin's despatch, would be no ground for the impeachment of the treaty of Lord Ashburton, or for proving that he had not ably and honorably discharged his duties; if blame should fall upon any one, it should fall upon those who have been conducting these negotiations for years.

*Extract, from Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, (3d series, vol. 68, pages 626, 627, 628, and 629,) of a corrected speech delivered by Lord Brougham in the House of Lords on the 7th April, 1843, on the proposition of thanks to Lord Ashburton for the treaty of Washington.*

A great charge against Mr. Webster is, that he suppressed the map of Dr. Franklin in the course of the negotiation; and this suppression has been said to savor of bad faith. I deny it. I deny that a negotiator, in carrying on a controversy, as representing his own country, with a foreign country, is bound to disclose to the other party whatever he may know that tells against his own country, and for the opposite party. I deny that he is so bound, any more than an advocate is bound to tell the court all that he deems to make against his own client and for his adversary. My noble friend, Lord Ashburton, has been objected to—my noble friend opposite has been blamed for selecting him—because he is not a regular bred diplomatist; because he is not acquainted with diplomatic lore; because he is a plain unlettered man as regards diplomatic affairs; and because he had only the guide of common honesty and common sense, great experience of men, great general knowledge, a thorough acquaintance with the interests of his own country and of the country he was sent to, for his guide in the matters he was to negotiate. But I believe my noble friend has yet to learn this one lesson—that it is the duty of experienced diplomatists, of regular bred politicians, of those who have grown gray in the mystery of negotiation and the art of statescraft, that when you are sent to represent a country, and to get the best terms you can for it, to lower the terms of the opposite party, and to exalt the terms of your own, as far as may be—you ought first of all to disclose all the weaknesses of your own case—that your duty to your country is something, but that your duty is first to the opposite party, and that you are bound to tell everything that makes for that adverse party. That is your duty; that is one of those arts of diplomacy which have lain concealed until the present year 1843—one of those principles of statesmanship which it remained for the 6th of Victoria to produce and promulgate, but which were assuredly not quite understood by that old French statesman, albeit trained in the diplomatic school, who said that language had been conferred upon men by Providence for the purpose of concealing their thoughts. This was a lesson he had yet to learn, this regular-bred diplomatist—this practised negotiator. He certainly could not have thought that it was his duty to practise a window in his bosom, and let every one see what passed in his mind. But it was the duty, it seems, of my noble friend to tell all; and it was equally the reciprocal duty of Mr. Webster to do the same. It was my noble friend's duty, to disclose all that he had

found out against the negotiation he went to conduct. That was the new art, the new mystery, the new discovery of 1843; but I find my honorable friend, Mr. Webster, has great authority, and that even if he were wrong, he errs in excellent good company. It does so happen that there was a map published by the King's geographer in this country in the reign of his Majesty George III; and here I could appeal to an illustrious duke whom I now see, whether that monarch was not as little likely to err from any fulness of attachment towards America, as any one of his faithful subjects! [The Duke of Cambridge: I hear.] Because he well knows that there was no one thing which his revered parent had so much at heart as the separation from America, and there was nothing he deplored so much as that separation having taken place. The King's geographer, Mr. Faden, published his map 1783, which contains, not the British, but the American line. Why did not my noble friend take over a copy of that map? My noble friend opposite (Lord Aberdeen) is a candid man; he is an experienced diplomatist, both abroad and at home; he is not unlettered, but thoroughly conversant in all the crafts of diplomacy and statesmanship. Why did he conceal this map? We have a right to complain of that; and I, on the part of America, complain of that. You ought to have sent out the map of Mr. Faden, and said, "this is George the Third's map." But it never occurred to my noble friend to do so. Then, two years after Mr. Faden published that map, another was published, and that took the British line. This, however, came out after the boundary had become matter of controversy, *post litum motum*. But, at all events, my noble friend had to contend with the force of the argument against Mr. Webster, and America had a right to the benefit of both maps. My noble friend opposite never sent it over, and nobody ever blamed him for it. But that was not all. What if there was another map containing the American line, and never corrected at all by any subsequent chart coming from the same custody? And what if that map came out of the custody of a person high in office in this country—nay, what if it came out of the custody of the highest functionary of all,—of George 3d himself? I know that map—I know a map which I can trace to the custody of George 3d, and on which there is the American line and not the English line, and upon which there is a note, that from the hand-writing, as it has been described to me, makes me think it was the note of George 3d himself: "This is the line of Mr. Oswald's treaty in 1733," written three or four times upon the face of it. Now, suppose this should occur—I do not know that it has happened—but it may occur to a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,—either to my noble friend or Lord Palmerston, who, I understand by common report, taken a great interest in the question; and though he may not altogether approve of the treaty, he may peradventure envy the success which attended it, for it was a success which did not attend any of his own American negotiations. But it is possible that my noble friend or Lord Palmerston may have discovered that there was this map, because George 3d's library, by the munificence of George 4th, was given to the British Museum, and this map must have been there; but it is a curious circumstance that it is no longer there. I suppose it must have been taken out of the British Museum for the purpose of being sent over to my noble friend in America; and that, according to the new doctrines of diplomacy, he was bound to have used it when there, in order to show that he had no case—that he not a leg to stand upon. Why did he not take it over with him? Probably he did not know of its existence. I am told that it is not now in the British Museum, but that it is in the Foreign Office. Probably it was known to exist; but somehow or other that map, which entirely destroys our contention and gives all to the Americans, has been removed from the British Museum, and is now to be found at the Foreign Office. Explain it as you will, that is the simple fact, that this important map was removed from the museum to the office, and not in the time of my noble friend [Lord Aberdeen.]

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